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Sur l'existence de mécanismes anonymes et équilibrés décentralisant les 
allocations de Lindahl 
Résumé 
Cette note aborde le problème de l'existence de mécanismes anonymes et 
équilibrés décentralisant les allocations de Lindahl. On montre un résultat 
d'impossibilité pour la classe de mécanismes définissant un homéomorphisme 
entre l'espace des messages et l'espace des allocations. 
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Summary. In this note, we discuss the existence of anonymous and balanced mechanisms to 
implement  the  Lindahl  allocations.  We  obtain  an  impossibility  result  for  the  class  of 




The  economic  literature  highlights  a  sharp  contrast  between  the  properties  of  economic 
mechanisms implementing the Lindahl allocations, in small (i.e., with two agents) and large 
economies (i.e., with more than two agents). 
Usually,  an  economic  mechanism  is  required  to  be  balanced,  individually  feasible  and 
continuous. It is said to be balanced if both equilibrium and disequilibrium outcomes induce 
neither  surplus  nor  deficit  of  the  numeraire.  It  is  said  to  be  individually  feasible  if  both 
equilibrium  and  disequilibrium  outcomes  belong  to  the  consumption  sets  of  every  agent. 
These  conditions  ensure  that  the  outcome  of  the  mechanism  remain  always  feasible.  A 
justification of continuity of the outcome function is that a Nash equilibrium must be robust to 
unwanted deviation or “trembles” in strategies (de Trenqualye, 1994). 
In small economies, these conditions can never be satisfied altogether, if the mechanism 
fully implements in Nash equilibrium the Lindahl correspondence (i.e., any Nash equilibrium 
yields a Lindahl allocation and, conversely, any Lindahl allocation can be obtained as a Nash 
equilibrium). Kwan and Nakamura (1987) prove that a balanced mechanism implementing the 
Lindahl  correspondence  cannot  be  continuous.  Intuitively,  this  is  due  to  a  basic 
incompatibility between Lindahl implementation, which requires that the players must not be 
able to affect their share in the cost of the public good, and balancedness, which implies that 
they  actually  are.  However,  Miura  (1982)  provides  a  discontinuous  game  form,  which  is 
balanced and fully implements the Lindahl correspondence. 
In  large  economies,  mechanisms  exist  that  satisfy  all  the  desiderata  at  the  same  time 
(Hurwicz, 1979; Tian, 1989; Walker, 1981). Indeed, with at least three players, the conflict 
just outlined can be overcome, thanks to the use of cycles in the outcome function. Hurwicz 
(1986, p.1468) illustrates the general principle: “One may think of agents as arranged in a 
circle,  with  each  agent  setting  the  price  (acting  in  effect  as  an  auctioneer)  for  his/her 
neighbors”. 
As a corollary, the existing mechanisms, since there are based on such cycles, fail to be 
anonymous.  (An  outcome  function  is  said  anonymous  if  the  commodity  bundles  of  the 
individuals are invariant with any permutation of their indexes.). In this note, we prove that 
this  is  not  fortuitous.  Precisely,  we  show  the  incompatibility  between  the  conditions  of 
anonymity, balancedness and Lindahl implementation, for a class of mechanisms defining an 
homeomorphism between the message space and the allocation space. 
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The remainder of the note is organized as  follows. Section 2 formalizes the economic 
model and gives the main definitions. Our impossibility result is proven in Section 3. 
   
2. Notations and Definitions. 
We  consider  an  economy  with  one  private  good  x,  one  public  good  y  and  n  consumers, 
indexed i. We assume that the public good can be produced using the private one as an input, 
under a constant returns to scale technology. We normalize the units so that one unit of public 
good costs one unit of private good. Each consumer is characterized by his consumption set 
IR+
2, his initial endowment wi > 0 of the private good (none in the public good), and his 
preference ordering Ri, defined over IR+
2. The set of all such economies is denoted E, with 




An allocation is a vector ((xi)i
n
=1, y) ∈ IR
n+1 (giving the consumptions of the private and 





=1 pi* = 1, and an allocation ((xi*)i
n
=1, y*), such that: 
  (xi*, y*) Ri (xi, y), for all (xi, y) Î IR+
2 such that xi + pi* y ≤ wi, for all i, 
  Si
  n







=1, y*) is then called a Lindahl allocation (LA) of e. 
For  all  e  Î  E,  the  set  of  Lindahl  allocations  is  denoted  L(e).  L  is  called  a  Lindahl 
correspondence. 
 
A mechanism is a pair (´i
 n
=1 Mi, h), where Mi is a message space of agent i and h is an 
outcome function, mapping messages m = (mi)i
n
=1 from M := ´i
 n
=1 Mi into allocations h(m) in 
IR
n+1. More explicitly, we use the following notation: 
  h(m) = ((wi – Ti(m))i
n
=1, Y(m)), for all m Î M. 
 
Below, it will be convenient to define the associated net trade correspondence: 
  g(m) = ((Ti(m))i
n
=1, Y(m)), for all m Î M. 
 
A Nash equilibrium (NE) of (M, h) is a joint strategy m* such that, for all i (
2):  
  m* Ri* (m*/mi), for all mi Î Mi, 
where: (m*/mi) = (m1*, …, mi, …, mn*). 
For all e Î E, the set of Nash equilibriums is denoted v(e). The set of the corresponding 
allocations h(v(e)) is denoted N(e). N is said to be a Nash correspondence. 
 
Let us consider the following conditions about the mechanism. 
 
Definition 1. (M, h) is said to be anonymous if: 
  (i) M1 = … = Mn := M, 
  (ii) g(ms(1), …, ms(n)) = ((Ts(i)(m))i
n
=1, Y(m)), for all m ∈ M, 
where s denotes any permutation of {1, …, n}. 
 
Definition 2. (M, h) is said to be balanced if: 
                                                 
(
2) The preferences Ri* of i over M are defined by: m’ Ri* m Û hi(m’) Ri hi(m), where we denote hi(m) the 
commodity bundle of i in the allocation h(m).   3 
  Si
  n
=1 Ti(m) = Y(m), for all m Î M. 
 
Definition 3. (M, h) is said to implement the Lindahl correspondence if: 
  L(e) = N(e), for all e Î E. 
 
3. Inexistence of anonymous mechanisms. 
Many  mechanisms  have  been  proposed  to  implement  the  Lindahl  allocations  with  Nash 
equilibrium,  including  those  in  Hurwicz  (1979),  Kim  (1993),  Tian  (1989),  de  Trenqualye 
(1994) and Walker (1981). However, they all contradict either definition 1 (Hurwicz, 1979; 
Tian, 1989; Walker, 1981), definition 2 (Kim, 1993), or both (de Trenqualye, 1994). This 
supports the belief that the three conditions could in fact be incompatible. Proposition 1 shows 
the incompatibility  for  a class of mechanisms,  such that the outcome function defines an 
homeomorphism between the messages space and the space of allocations. 
 
Proposition 1. If the set of environment E is rich enough, there exists no mechanism (M, h) 
which satisfies the following conditions: 
(1) It is anonymous,   
(2) It is balanced, 
(3) It implements the Lindahl correspondence, 
(4) The mapping g defines an homeomorphism between A = {m Î M; Y(m) > 0} and Z = 
{((ti)i
n
=1, y) ∈ IR
n+1; Si
  n
=1 ti = y > 0}. 
 
Remark 1. Among the mechanisms reviewed above, only Walker (1981) satisfies condition 
4. The subscription mechanism, defined by Mi = IR, for all i, M = IR
n and g(m) = (mi, Si
  n
=1 mi), 
for all m Î IR
n, also has this property.  
   
Proof. Assume that the set of environment E is reach enough, so that it includes all preference 
profiles R = (Ri)i
n
=1 such that, for all i, Ri is complete, transitive, strictly increasing and convex. 
 
Lemma 1. For all m ∈ A, Ti(m) = Tj(m) if, and only if, mi = mj, for all i, j.  
 
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider i = 1 and j = 2 in this proof. 
Consider m = (m1, m2, …, mn) ∈ A. Let m’ = (m2, m1, …, mn), which is derived from m, by 
permuting the strategies of players 1 and 2. We have: 
  g(m)  = (T1(m), T2(m), …, Tn(m), Y(m)),    (by definition of g) 
  g(m’)  = (T2(m), T1(m), …, Tn(m), Y(m)).    (by condition 1) 
If we assume that m1 = m2, then m = m’ and g(m) = g(m’). This implies that T1(m) = T2(m). 
If we assume that T1(m) = T2(m), then g(m) = g(m’). Now, m and m’ belong to A (for Y(m’) = 
Y(m) > 0) and g is a bijection between A and Z. This implies that m = m’ and m1 = m2. QED 
 




  Z* = {((ti)i
n
=1, y) ∈ IR
n+1; 0 < ti < wi, for all i, and Si
  n
=1 ti = y}, 
  A* = {m Î M; g(m) ∈ Z*}. 
By  condition  4,  g  defines  an  homeomorphism  between  A*  and  Z*  (as  Z*  ⊂  Z).  Since 
condition 2 implies that: 
  A* = g
–1({((ti)i
n
=1, y) ∈ IR
n+1; 0 < ti < wi, for all i}),   4 
A* is open, as the preimage of an open set by the continuous mapping g. Let B be a base of M, 
with generic elements denoted O. Let B be the subset of B
n, such that ´i
 n
=1 Oi ⊂ A*. As A* is 
open in the product topology M, B is an open covering of A*. 
 
Lemma  2.  Let  z  ∈  Z*  be  such  that  z  =  (t,  …,  t,  y).  Let  m  =  g
–1(z)  ∈  A*  be  the 
corresponding message. By lemma 1, m = (a, …, a), for some a ∈ M. An open (square) 
neighbourhood U of m exists such that U = ´i
 n
=1 O ⊂ A* and V = h(U) ⊂ Z* is an open 
neighbourhood of z.  
 
 
Figure 1. Illustration of Lemma 2. 
 
Proof. Take z = (t, …, t, y) ∈ Z*. Let m = g
–1(z) ∈ A*. Since T1(m) = … = Tn(m) = t, by lemma 
1, m = (a, …, a) , for some a ∈ M. We can find W = (´i
  n
=1 Oi) Î B, such that m Î W ⊂ A* (for 
B is an open covering of A*). Choose O in {O1, …, On}, such that O Í Oi, for all i. Define U 
= ´i
 n
=1 O. It is clear that U contains m, is open and belongs to A*. As U is open and g
–1 is 
continuous, V = g(U) is open. The fact that V is a subset of Z* containing z is immediate. QED 
 
Lemma 3. Pick z* = (T*, t*, …, t*, y*) ∈ V, such that T* > t*. Let m* = g
–1(z*) ∈ U be the 
associated message. One can find e ∈ E such that h(m*) ∈ L(e), but m* ∉ v(e). 
 
 
      A. Consumer 1.      B. Consumers 2 through n. 
Figure 2. Illustration of Lemma 3. 
 
Proof. Since V is an open neighbourhood of z = (t, …, t, y), one can find z* = (T*, t*, …, t*, 
y*) ∈ V, with T* > t*. Let m* = g
–1(z*) ∈ U. Using T* > t* together with condition 2, it is 
clear that:   5 
  - for player 1:     T1(m*) = T* > (1/n) y* = (1/n) Y(m*), 
  - for the other players:  Tj(m*) = t* < (1/n) y* = (1/n) Y(m*).   (j = 2, …, n) 
From this, z* lies below (resp. above) line (D) in Figure 2.A (resp. Figure 2.B), where (D) is 
the line representing ti = (1/n) y, i = 1, …, n (or, equivalently, xi + (1/n) y = wi, i = 1, …, n). 
By lemma 1, m* = (A*, a*,…, a*), for some A*, a* ∈ M. By a unilateral deviation, player 
1 can reach the strategy profile m’ = (a*, a*,…, a*) ∈ U. The corresponding net trade z’ = 
g(m’) has the form (t’, …, t’, y’), by lemma 1, and belongs to V. From condition 2: 
  - for all players:    Ti(m’) = t’ = (1/n) y’ = (1/n) Y(m’).     (i = 1, …, n) 
Hence, z’ lies somewhere on line (D) in both Figures 2.A and 2.B. 
Now, there exists e ∈ E such that I1, in Figure 2.A, and Ij, in Figure 2.B, are indifference 
curves  of  consumers  1  and  j  (j  =  2,  …,  n),  respectively.  Then,  the  allocation  h(m*), 
corresponding to z*, is a LA of e (with the Lindahl prices given by the slopes of the lines (D1) 
and (Dj), in Figures 2.A and 2.B, respectively). One the other hand, since z’ lies strictly above 
I1 in Figure 2.A, the allocation h(m’), corresponding to z’, is such that (w1 – T1(m’), Y(m’)) P1 
(w1 – T1(m*), Y(m*)) and m’ P1* m*. Hence, m* is not a NE. QED 
 
Now,  to  complete  the  proof  of  proposition  1,  read  z*  as  the  allocation  h(m*)  (the 
contradiction with the notations in Lemma 3 should not be confusing). Since A* and Z* are in 
bijection through h, m* is the unique strategy implementing z*. Hence, for the environment e 
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